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THE FATE OF DOMESTIC EXPORTERS UNDER THE BYRD 
AMENDMENT AS CASE STUDY FOR RESUSCITATING 
LAST-IN-TIME TREATY INTERPRETATION 
 
ANDREW PLATT∗ 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
United States trade policy is necessarily influenced by powerful 
political and economic interests but is also bound by national and 
international law. When foreign importers believe they have been 
harmed by U.S. policy, international principles support and national 
law provides the right to claim redress in the U.S. courts. However, 
due to U.S. trade policies that contravene treaty obligations, it may be 
argued that aggrieved domestic exporters are not provided with a 
remedy. This comment illustrates what effect adopting one of the 
competing schools of treaty interpretation would have on the case 
study “the 2000 Byrd Amendment in the WTO Appellate body in 2003 
and in the U.S. Court of International Trade in 2006.” This Comment 
argues that harmed domestic exporters will only have a remedy if 
courts honor the last-in-time rule of treaty reconciliation because, 
absent this doctrine, Constitutional protections against takings are 
insufficient in light of the taxing and spending power. 
Known as the Byrd Amendment, the Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSO) distributes funds collected from 
antidumping duties to U.S. companies who make successful dumping 
complaints.1 For instance, steel importers who undercut U.S. market 
prices are charged with dumping penalties, as would occur in any 
country; and then according to the Byrd Amendment, the amount 
charged will be distributed back to the U.S. producers who 
complained. The intent behind the CDSO is to support companies 
threatened by overseas competition. However, it creates a problem 
when the anti-dumping duties bring imports up to market value, 
because the subsequent payments subsidize the American producers 
that are no longer at an unfair disadvantage. 
When the United States signed the treaty establishing the WTO, it 
agreed to follow certain rules. The WTO claims that the CDSO breaks 
 
 
∗ J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University (2007). 
1 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000). 
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the rules that the United States committed to follow. Although the 
WTO has no power to legislate for any country,2 it allows other 
member countries to hit back by charging a tariff equal to the illegal 
payments. These countries, including several of America’s favorite 
trade partners—the EU, Canada, Mexico, and Japan—may pick their 
targets so as to motivate the United States to play by the rules. 
The EU targets, among other imports, fabrics and shoes.3 It 
charges a proportional duty to U.S. exports to compensate for the 
payments made to U.S. companies under the Byrd Amendment. For 
example, the EU will charge a fifteen percent duty on American 
shoemakers every time the United States charges duties on other 
European companies and gives the proceeds of those duties to 
American steel companies. Simplified to its essence, whenever U.S. 
steel producers receive the proceeds of a duty, U.S. shoemakers must 
pay—and they are not happy about it. Now that Congress 
acknowledged the illegitimacy of the act, exporters will be even 
angrier, but these companies—who are doing nothing wrong—will 
continue to pay duties through 2008, and likely into the future. 
What remedies do the shoemakers or any of the “innocent” 
companies have? Since they remain trapped between the international 
law and domestic law, they must rely on domestic courts to harmonize 
the two. Regardless of the WTO’s interpretation, the enactment of the 
CDSO was clearly legal in the United States. On this plane, legality 
simply means it is constitutional within Congress’ enumerated Article 
I power to regulate interstate commerce. At the same time, it is just as 
clear that it is illegal on the international plane. Internationally, the 
simplest category of illegal actions is direct treaty violations. But 
where can a company bring a suit under international law? Or more 
fundamentally, who could they sue? Individual corporations have no 
standing in the international realm where abuses are resolved country-
to-country or perhaps between a country and an international 
organization. That is to say, bodies like the U.N. or the WTO possess 
enough power to act with a set of limited powers to redress abuses. A 
U.S. shoemaker who feels wrongfully harmed by the CDSO has no 
recourse in the international plane. Nor does it have a representative 
except—and here is the irony for the shoemaker—its own government.  
 
 
2 John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: 
Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 112 (2004). 
3 Communication of the European Communities, United States—Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 2, WT/DS217/47 (May 4, 2005) available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/217-47.doc. 
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Therefore, an “innocent” U.S. company charged with retaliatory 
duties would have to sue under U.S. law. The supremacy clause, 
Article VI, includes treaties as the “supreme law of the land” along 
with congressional legislation. On the face of it, a U.S. court must 
consider the Byrd Amendment’s international illegality on one hand 
and its domestic legality on the other. Fortunately, a common-law 
solution exists for this apparent collision: the last-in-time rule. Thus, 
when a treaty is in place first and Congress subsequently passes 
“clearly contradictory” legislation, the latter is the “supreme” law.4 
The collision of doctrines indicates that courts should evaluate the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the implementation and the 
purposes of the treaty. In the case of the CDSO, the legislation can and 
should be interpreted so as to give effect to the United States 
international obligation and spare “innocent” domestic exporters. 
To approach this novel question, this paper will assert that the U.S. 
companies harmed by the CDSO’s illegality (subject to retaliatory 
duties) must resist the recent erosion of the U.S. last-in-time 
jurisprudence if they are to have any chance of relief in the courts. Part 
II will describe the reasoning of the WTO decision against the CDSO. 
Part III will explain the treatment of the CDSO in U.S. Courts and will 
explore why the only viable remedy in light of the last-in-time canon 
is the judicial redefinition of the CDSO. 
 
II. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE APPELLATE  
BODY REPORT 
 
A. The WTO Dispute Resolution Process Defines International Law 
 
Dumping is a distortion of free trade whereby a foreign company 
attempts to undercut prices in a domestic market to drive out local 
competition. To equalize prices, the importing country charges 
antidumping duties—fees to bring the imported products up to market 
value. The WTO oversees these actions so that disputes over 
procedural fairness or the size of an antidumping duty do not escalate 
into trade wars. If states are not able to resolve dumping disputes, 
WTO/GATT treaties authorize a victim of unfair antidumping duties 
 
 
4 In this context, “in place” is used as short hand to assume ratification for 
Article II treaties or valid exercises of the foreign relations power for executive 
agreements as well as being either self-executing or appropriately implemented. The 
discussion of these issues is avoided as the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, P.L. No. 
103-465, 108 Stat. 4815 gives a clear date for when the treaty was “in place” as Dec. 
8, 1994 (and thus entered into force Jan. 1, 1995). 
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to charge countervailing duties—fees to compensate for excessive 
antidumping duties. 
The term, “countervailing duty,” suggests the intention to 
counteract an imbalance; so where possible, the target should be the 
same industry that is subject to unfair antidumping duties.5 Only where 
this is determined to be ineffective are countries allowed to take action 
against different industries through the principle of cross-retaliation. 
Whereas compliance with most international agreements is motivated 
only by the golden rule’s do-unto-others principles, the WTO dispute 
resolution mechanism contains powerful consequences. Cross-
retaliatory countervailing duties are hit-where-it-hurts penalties 
designed to fuel internal political pressure to bring a country in line 
with its international obligations. 
While the dispute process is conducted between countries, if 
countervailing duties are awarded, it is the offending country’s 
companies, not its government, who pay for it. The award is 
conceptualized as a suspension of the benefits—the concessions—
normally made to the countries by virtue of their membership in the 
WTO. By the award, the complaining countries may charge duties on 
classes of goods from the offending country in the amounts approved 
by a WTO arbitrator. They will continue to collect these duties from 
the companies of the offending country in these industries until the 
offender conforms to its commitments.6  
In the hierarchy of international law, treaties are the strongest—or 
at least the clearest—type of law,7 and the dispute resolution process 
amounts to a legal interpretation of the states’ treaty obligations. Thus, 
a WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) decision is a binding 
determination of a breach of the treaty in dispute.8 That is to say, other 
nations may treat the United States as a party in breach of nothing 
 
 
5 Only Japan imported enough bearings and steel products to make imposing 
countervailing duties on these imports, while other countries settled for cross-
retaliation. Japan Fines U.S. Exports to Protest Byrd, METAL CENTER NEWS, Aug. 
2005, available at http://www.metalcenternews.com/2005/August/mcn0508Assoc.htm 
#Japan.  
6 And only that long. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, art. 22.8, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay 
Round, 33 I.L.M 1125 (1194) [hereinafter DSU] available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/ 28-dsu.pdf. 
7 Statute of the International Court of Justice 1946 U.N.Y.B. 843 at 846, 3 
T.I.A.S. 1179, ch. II, art 38; Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States § 101 (1986). 
8 DSU arts. 19, 22. 
SPRING 2007 BYRD AMENDMENT 
175 
more than a WTO finding. Nevertheless, because the U.S. courts have 
created their own rules on the effect of international law, they would 
likely scrutinize a WTO Appellate Body report for themselves.9 
 
B. The Complaint and DSB Report 
 
The complaining parties convinced the DSB panel10 that the 
CDSO was mandatory legislation that violated the basic remedy 
provisions of the free trade agreement inasmuch as it was a “specific 
action”11 under Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement12 (AD) 
and Article 32.1 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement13 (SCM). Although these complaints were the heart of the 
dispute, the fact that parties further argued—and the DSB found—that 
the CDSO payments amounted to procedural distortions, encouraging 
a larger segment of an industry to band-wagon (violating Article 5.4 of 
the AD Agreement and Article 11.4 of the SCM Agreement14). The 
DSB panel did not agree with the complaining parties that the 
incentives in turn illegally prevented the accused importer from having 
a fair opportunity to cure the violation. The panel reported that 
 
 
9 For example, the Appellate Body report articulated an expanded reading of an 
essential aspect of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement in this case, 
and, given the tendency of U.S. courts to engage in intent-based treaty interpretation it 
might question whether this expanded interpretation represents the treaty that the 
United States intended to sign. See John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the 
Constitution and the Rule of Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 163, 174 (2001). 
10 Panel Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000, ¶ 4.86,WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234/R (Sep. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Panel Report], 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/cases_e/ds217_e.htm 
(follow “Panel Report” hyperlink; then follow language code “E” hyperlink). 
11 That is, import regulations are permissible if provided for in the treaty or 
incidental to imports, but not when they are targeted, or “specific.” 
12 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter AD Agreement] available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf. The only difference between the two provisions is 
the reference to dumping in the AD agreement and subsidies in the SCM agreement. 
13 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCM 
Agreement] available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf; 
Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 3.2–3.3. 
14 These provisions use similar language to define the (only) permissible 
procedures for commencing an investigation. 
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because the text of the CDSO harmonized with the statistical 
thresholds of AD 5.4 and SCM 11.4, and because there was no 
indication that the amendment was implemented in a manner contrary 
to the two articles, the United States was not accountable for its 
possible motives in denying a proposal for cure (an “undertaking”).15  
The complaining countries alleged, as they must when asking for 
countervailing duties, that these violations “nullif[y] or impair[] 
benefits accruing them” under WTO agreements. This allegation 
presumes they are harmed by being deprived of what, under the treaty, 
they are entitled to—namely, the “benefit” of a certain level of access 
to the U.S. markets. In finding that the CDSO eliminated or interfered 
with the agreed conditions, the DSB panel held that complaining 
parties had a right to compensatory (i.e. retaliatory) duties. Likewise, 
because the CDSO constituted “specific action,” it further violated the 
United States’ agreement to conform its domestic law with the WTO 
treaties it signed.16 
 
C. The Appellate Report 
 
Faced with millions of dollars of retaliatory duties on its 
companies’ annual exports, the United States appealed the DSB’s 
determination that the CDSO was a “specific action” against dumping 
and subsidization and that it illegally encouraged dumping complaints. 
To avoid retaliatory countervailing duties, it had to persuade the 
Appellate Body on both issues, for either one would represent non-
conformity with international commitments and thereby nullify or 
impair benefits of the complaining parties. In the end, the United 
States succeeded only in convincing the Appellate Body to reverse the 
unfair complaint procedure determination. However, in affirming the 
DSB panel’s “specific action” finding, the Appellate Body rejected the 
panel’s determinations of law and substituted its own. Further, the 
U.S. appeal successfully eliminated overly-broad language used in the 
DSB report. 
 
 
 
 
15 Panel Report, supra note 10, at ¶ 3.3. The U.S. also prevailed on two other 
issues. India and Indonesia asserted that the CDSO further violated their special WTO 
status as developing countries under AD 5, but failed on procedural grounds. Mexico 
boldly alleged that the CDSO was not only a “specific action,” but rose to the level of 
a subsidy under SCM 5. Mexico failed to convince the DSB that it was such a direct 
violation of the central values of the WTO agreement.  
16 Embodied in AD Agreement art. 18.4 and SCM Agreement art. 32.5. 
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  U.S.’s Score Sheet 
Issue DSB panel Appellate 
“Specific Action” + “against” Against Against 
Encourages industry to complain Against For 
Process for Cure For 
Conformity of domestic law Against Against 
“Nullifies or impairs benefit” Against Against 
 
The U.S. appeal forced a clarification of the meaning in AD 18.117 
and SCM 32.118 of a “specific action against” dumping or subsidy. 
The Appellate Body described the “specific action against” language 
as condition precedent for the applicability of these provisions. If a 
challenged measure were neither a “specific action” nor “against” 
dumping/subsidization, it would escape the analysis under Article 18.1 
of the AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. Any 
measure that is both specific and against dumping/subsidization must 
fit within the GATT agreements. At first glance, the very title of the 
Byrd Amendment, the Continuing Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act, 
suggested an action against dumping and subsidization; however, 
neither the DSB panel nor the Appellate Body relied on this,19 and the 
U.S. appeal pushed the Appellate Body to define the important terms 
of the treaty. 
 
1. “Specific Action” 
 
While the principle of stare decisis is not incorporated into the 
WTO system, the “governing” Appellate interpretation of the treaty 
language comes from the 2000 decision in United States—Anti-
 
 
17 No specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be 
taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this 
Agreement. This in not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of 
GATT 1994, as appropriate. 
18 No specific action against a subsidy of another Member can be taken except in 
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement. This 
paragraph is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of 
GATT 1994, where appropriate. 
19 But the DSB panel was tempted to. Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 7.27. The 
Congressional findings attached to the Byrd Amendments explicitly provided, “United 
States unfair trade laws have as their purpose the restoration of conditions of fair trade 
so that jobs and investment that should be in the United States are not lost through the 
false market signals.” Congressional Findings, P.L. 106-387, § 1(a), 114 Stat. 1549 
(emphasis added).  
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Dumping Act of 1916.20 The pre-WTO language at issue there targeted 
predatory pricing without calling it “dumping.” Nevertheless, using a 
“constituent elements” analysis, the Appellate Body found that 
predatory pricing was using the same criteria as dumping. Because the 
AD Agreement recited the only permissible anti-dumping remedies, 
the additional step of giving the proceeds of the duties to competitors 
was inconsistent with WTO agreements. 
In its analysis of the CDSO, the Appellate Body found that the 
CDSO embodied the constituent elements of dumping. Regardless of 
what it was called, the CDSO was “inextricably linked to, and strongly 
correlated with” dumping or subsidization investigations.21 The 
Appellate Body seized on the substance of the CDSO, particularly the 
mechanism that distributed payments only after duties had been 
collected pursuant to an order. Because the CDSO clearly stated that 
the anti-dumping or countervailing duty orders are imposed only 
following a determination of dumping or countervailing duties, the 
Appellate Body found that the Amendment was “inextricably linked” 
to dumping/subsidization. 
 
2. “Against” 
 
The Appellate Body’s analysis of the “against” prong dismissed 
the United States’ marshalling of various dictionary definitions of 
“against,” but was more careful with the underlying challenge as to 
whether a measure could be valid if it was only indirectly against 
dumping/subsidization. The United States attempted to challenge the 
DSB panel’s interpretation that “against” simply meant having “an 
adverse bearing on dumping or subsidization”22 (indirect effects) and 
suggested hostile or active (direct) opposition. The United States tried 
to emphasize that the CDSO’s impact on dumping was merely 
indirect, and channeling money to help threatened companies better 
compete was quite different from a law that attacked the importation 
 
 
20 Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, 
WT/DS136/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000) available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds136_e.htm (follow “Appellate Body Report” hyperlink; then follow 
language code “E” hyperlink). 
21 Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 4.86, WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234/R (Jan. 16, 2003) [hereinafter 
Appellate Report] available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ 
ds217_e.htm (follow “Appellate Body Report” hyperlink; then follow language code 
“E” hyperlink); Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 242. 
22 Id. ¶ 247. 
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directly by fining distributors who resold dumped goods, for example. 
The Appellate Body declined to limit the meaning of dumping to the 
definitions advocated by the United States because both the AD and 
SCM Agreements contemplated indirect actions by referring to 
“measures” against dumping/subsidization as a practice.23 In contrast, 
“[t]here is no express requirement that the measure must act against 
the imported dumped product, or entities responsible for that 
product.”24 
After affirming the expanded meaning of “against,” the Appellate 
Body moved quickly through the reasons why the CDSO met this 
definition: (1) the Amendment offsets were financed by duties, (2) the 
offsets were paid to the domestic companies who were “necessarily 
competitors” of the parties subject to duties, (3) domestic companies 
were eligible for offset payments based on “production of the same 
product” triggering the duties, and (4) the absence of restrictions on 
the use of the offset payments indicated that they may be used to gain 
advantage over the foreign competitors.25  
For foreign companies and countries, the obvious link between the 
duties levied and the subsidies paid is an incentive to avoid dumping 
or subsidization. Clearly, the U.S. competitors will be enriched by the 
fines the exporters pay to the degree that these exporters sell goods at 
prices below normal when the CDSO requires specific action against 
dumping/subsidization.  
The Appellate Body’s focus on the design and structure of the 
Byrd Amendment stands in contrast with the panel report’s emphasis 
on proven effects.26 One important thrust of the DSB’s analysis was 
that the Byrd distributions created inhospitable “conditions of 
competition.” Although the U.S. arguments forced the Appellate Body 
to address and reject this analysis, the result does not improve the U.S. 
situation in this case. In the end, it was much easier to find that the 
CDSO was by design and structure against dumping/subsidization than 
to prove that exports were actually harmed. 
 
3. The footnotes 
 
After deciding that the CDSO represented a specific action against 
dumping/subsidization, the Appellate Body analyzed the U.S.’s radical 
 
 
23 Id. ¶ 253. 
24 Id. ¶ 251. 
25 Id. ¶ 255. 
26 Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 7.62–7.63. 
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attempt to turn the test inside out before considering whether the 
Amendment’s provisions were inconsistent with the WTO agreements. 
The United States argued that the footnotes to the articles prohibiting 
non-WTO remedies indicated that the agreements were non-exclusive 
and allowed the type of subsidies the CDSO created. 
The United States represented that these footnotes merely clarify 
the hierarchy of WTO provisions by confining the exclusions in 
Articles 18.1 of the AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM 
Agreement to their respective realms. The AD Agreement, for 
example, specifies “[n]o specific action against dumping of exports 
from another Member can be taken except in accordance with the 
provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.” Footnote 
twenty four simply adds, “This is not intended to preclude action 
under other relevant provisions of GATT 1994, as appropriate.” Thus, 
even though other GATT measures naturally result in the inspections 
of dumped goods, such connection with dumping is not sufficient to 
bring an independent process in violation of the AD Agreement. The 
United States was essentially arguing that “an action that [fell] within 
Footnotes 24 and 56 [could not] be characterized as a specific action . 
. . and such action would, therefore, not be WTO-inconsistent.”27  
As background for the assertion that the footnotes overpower the 
meaning of the main provisions, the United States argued that the AD 
and SCM Agreements were non-exclusive. That is to say, even though 
these agreements restricted measures using certain enumerated 
strategies, an action such as the CDSO that did not fall into the 
discrete categories was, by definition, not a “specific action.” 
Although the Appellate Body was dismissive of this attempt (“this not 
only turn[ed] the normal approach to interpretation on its head, but it 
also [ran] counter to our finding in US–1916 Act”28), its refutation was 
methodic—presumably laying down strong enough reasoning to 
discourage future attempts to blow apart the WTO enforcement 
system. 
In its analysis of the prior arguments, the Appellate Body treated 
the AD and SCM Agreements as complementary in construction and 
object. While it eventually reached the same conclusion on the issue of 
exclusivity, it did not assume their equivalence from the outset. Not 
only did the nature of the three remedies treated in the AD Agreement 
differ from the four ones in the SCM Agreement, the US–1916 Act 
report only dealt with the former. Thus, while the dismissal of the 
 
 
27 Appellate Report, supra note 21, ¶ 262. 
28 Id. ¶ 262. 
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argument based on Footnote 24 (the AD Agreement) took up only two 
paragraphs, the question of Footnote 56 and the SCM Agreement 
consumed four pages. Despite the differences in the scope of the 
measures in the two agreements, the Appellate Body found that, by the 
“terminology and structure,” the two agreements embodied the same 
definitive “obligation or prohibition.”29 While the United States argued 
that GATT permitted actions against subsidies not mentioned in the 
SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body rejected this argument 
independent of an analogy with the AD Agreement. The Appellate 
Body interpreted the election of remedies requirement in Footnote 35 
combined with Article 32.1 (“No specific action against a subsidy of 
another Member can be taken except in accordance with the 
provisions of GATT”30) as definitive. If, in order to win this dispute, 
the United States had prevailed with the contention that the GATT 
remedies were non-exclusive, the precedent would cause a hemorrhage 
in the WTO enforcement system. If the agreements were suddenly 
interpreted to be nonexclusive, any country could use creatively 
structured duties and/or barriers to alter the landscape. This conclusion 
then brought the analysis to a third step of the prohibition of specific 
actions. In finding that GATT contained the only appropriate 
responses to dumping and subsidization, it also determined that the 
CDSO response was inconsistent. 
The Appellate Body’s determination that the AD and SCM 
Agreements resulted in an identical “obligation or prohibition” was 
probably the most significant rule of the case31 but one that was not 
necessary to trigger retaliatory duties. Whereas US–1916 Act clarified 
the underlying principles but did not delineate the boundaries of AD 
18.1 and SCM 32.1, the declaration that their reach was identical 
removed this ambiguity.  
The statement is useful, but is it non-binding dicta? In the WTO 
system, the question of the violation is separate from the amount of 
penalties. In our common law system, it makes sense for a court to 
limit its determination to the issues that decide the outcome and 
controversy before it so that the pronouncements that do not influence 
the outcome are not binding on future cases. In this case, the penalties 
are the same whether the CDSO violates only the AD Agreement or 
the SCM Agreement or both. But because the process of determining 
 
 
29 Appellate Report, supra note 21, ¶ 268. 
30 Emphasis added. 
31 Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2003, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 317, 344 (2004). 
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penalties is separate from the determination of a violation by the 
“reasonable” time to correct the violation, it is not only permissible for 
the Appellate Body to make determinations that do not increase 
penalties, it is essential for it to make a complete determination of the 
State’s noncompliance. Only a full determination would particularize 
the requirements of subsequent corrective action. The Appellate 
Body’s pronouncement on the measures permitted by the SCM 
Agreement is just as binding as any other decision—meaning that 
while it is not “dicta,” it is still binding in that future disputes are 
legally required to follow it. In the absence of stare decisis, it will be 
followed in the future depending on the strength of its reasoning, 
which is why a full analysis was employed. 
 
4. Incentives and bad faith breach 
 
Although the United States did not prevail on the central question 
of “specific action,” the appeal eliminated the overly-broad holding of 
the DSB panel regarding the discretion of customs officials and the 
duty of good faith. The DSB panel was greatly influenced by the 
evidence that the companies that would not have supported anti-
dumping petitions changed their position in order to qualify for 
potential Byrd Amendment distributions.32 Since GATT required that 
a majority of an affected domestic industry support an investigation, 
the DSB panel was concerned that the prospect of the CDSO 
distribution was distorting this requirement and found that the 
Amendment’s distributions were such powerful incentives that they 
defeated the “object and purpose” of GATT. The Appellate Body was 
critical of a resort to “object and purpose” when the plain language of 
the CDSO complied exactly with the industry representation 
requirements of GATT. While the DSB panel had gone so far as to 
state that the CDSO “in effect mandate[d] domestic producers to 
support [an] application,”33 the Appellate Body reversed both this 
decision and the determination that the mere failure to implement the 
GATT obligations constituted bad faith. Even though the elimination 
of the unwarranted conclusions in the Panel Report did not decrease 
the “reasonable amount of time” allowed for compliance,34 nor 
 
 
32 Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 7.6; cf. Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, 
¶¶ 284–85. 
33 Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 293. 
34  “Factors external to the legislative process itself are of no relevance for the 
determination of the reasonable period of time for implementation.” Award of the 
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increase the amount of “damages” the complaining parties might 
receive,35 the elimination of these overly inclusive principles may have 
been enough justification for an appeal even if the United States knew 
it would lose on the other issues.36 
The finding that the United States acted inconsistently with its 
GATT obligations triggers two results. First, AD 18.4 and SCM 32.5 
provide that each signatory “shall take all necessary steps” to integrate 
GATT provisions into their own laws. This obligation applies to the 
laws in place at the time of signing the Uruguay Accord as well as 
subsequent laws. The United States broke its commitment in enacting 
the Byrd Amendment, and a U.S. court would not find any grounds to 
invalidate the finding. Second, the infringement of any obligation “is 
considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or 
impairment” of benefits that ought to accrue to other members.37 That 
is to say, the violation itself triggers the relief without any 
demonstration of harm. Because the GATT framework provides 
significant tariff reductions on condition of mutual compliance, when 
a member’s rights to the benefits are “impaired,” it may likewise 
decline to extend the offending state the benefits of GATT 
membership—according to WTO DSU principles. 
 
D. The Aftermath 
 
The Appellate Body report clarified the GATT treaty for future 
cases. The final decision tightened the “specific action against” test, 
eliminated poorly reasoned sections of the Panel Report, and collapsed 
the analysis of the exclusivity of remedies under both the AD and 
SCM Agreements. Of course, the case was also a real case and 
controversy, although at the WTO a decision is not an executable court 
order that triggers relief. The WTO has no power to impose legislation 
on any member country, but it authorizes other countries to withhold 
 
 
Arbitrator, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 24, 
WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22 (Jun. 13, 2003) available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ ds217_e.htm (follow “Article 21.3(c) Arbitration 
Report” hyperlink; then follow language code “E” hyperlink). 
35 AD Agreement, supra note 12, art. 22.6; Decision by the Arbitrator, United 
States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 3.47, WT/DS217/ 
ARB/EEC (Aug. 31, 2004) available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds217_e.htm (follow “Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report” 
hyperlink; then follow language code “E” hyperlink). 
36 Bhala & Gantz, supra note 31, at 346–47. 
37 DSU art. 3.8. 
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the benefits of a treaty until the non-complying member assumes all its 
obligations. Once the CDSO was found to be inconsistent with U.S.’s 
treaty obligations, the United States then had to return to compliance 
within a “reasonable time” to avoid the benefit withholding.  
If the United States failed to comply by December 27, 2003, the 
complaining parties could seek authorization to “suspend concessions” 
by charging the U.S. companies for the illegal CDSO distributions.38 
On August 31, 2004, another arbitral panel set seventy-two percent as 
the rate of the CDSO distributions that had come from their countries 
and that they could now charge the U.S. companies.39 The 
countervailing duty is triggered by the presumption that a violation of 
an agreement is an “impairment or nullification,” not by the actual 
calculation of damages. As trade negotiations failed to produce results 
in 2005, the EU, Canada, Japan, and Mexico, each obtained approval 
to collect countervailing duties on various products to motivate U.S. 
compliance.40 These amounts vary by industry and destination but 
were estimated to amount to at least $114 million for 2005.41 
Throughout the process, the U.S.’s representatives have accepted 
the legitimacy of the WTO’s authority in this dispute and the validity 
of its treaty obligation. The dispute involved the meaning of the trade 
agreement, not its validity or existence. Since the Appellate Body’s 
finding, the United States has submitted regular reports to the DSB 
appraising the progress of various bills to repeal the CDSO as they 
advanced or failed through Congress.42 Each of these communications 
reiterated the U.S.’s intent to comply with the WTO and recognized 
 
 
38 Award of the Arbitrator, supra note 34, ¶ 83. 
39 Decision by the Arbitrator (Canada), United States—Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 3.149, WT/DS234/ARB/CAN, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds234_e.htm (follow “Recourse 
to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report” hyperlink; then follow language code “E” 
hyperlinks); Decision by the Arbitrator (Mexico), United States—Continued Dumping 
and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 3.151, WT/DS234/ARB/MEX (Aug. 31, 2004), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds234_e.htm 
(follow “Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report” hyperlink; then follow language 
code “E” hyperlinks). 
40 Decision by the Arbitrator (Canada) ¶ 6.3. 
41 Press Release, Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition, CITAC 
Publishes 2005 ‘Byrd Amendment Millionaires Club;’ Payouts Total $226 Million in 
2005, $1. 26 Billion Since 2001 (Dec. 12, 2005), http://www.citac.info/press/release/ 
2005/12_12.php. 
42 Addenda one to twenty-two to Status Report by the United States, United 
States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 WT/DS217/16, 
WT/DS234/24 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
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that it breached its international obligations. If a corporation took 
responsibility in this way by recognizing their duty and breach, it 
would have the effect of blood in the water, exciting a frenzy of claims 
by anyone harmed by the breach. However, the United States is a state 
actor in the realm of international trade where corporations have no 
standing and no exporter subject to the countervailing duties can sue 
there. May private domestic claims fail as well? 
 
III. THE CDSO AND THE LAST-IN-TIME SUPREMACY CLAUSE 
 
If a U.S. machinery manufacturer doing business in the EU called 
its attorney after the suspension of concessions was published on 
August 31, 2005, what would it have learned about the fifteen percent 
duty it would suddenly have to pay? Should it sue at the WTO to get it 
all reversed? Could it sue the ball-bearings producer across town 
because it received the CDSO distributions that triggered the duties? 
Could it sue the entire bearing industry for supporting the anti-
dumping investigation? Should it sue the federal government, instead? 
Is this a taking, or a tax?  
Heedless of the plight of harmed domestic industries, Congress did 
not repeal the CDSO until trading partners actually started charging 
countervailing duties. This appears to be a tacit acknowledgment that 
the CDSO was illegal—or at least ill-conceived—and as such the fact 
that the U.S. companies will be paying countervailing duties for years 
to come is an even greater incentive to sue.43 However, if there is 
nowhere and no one to sue, the solutions must be purely political. 
 
 
43 The language in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 
Stat. 4, § 7601(b) reads:  
 
All duties on entries of goods made and filed before October 1, 
2007, that would, but for subsection (a) of this section [the part 
that repeals the CDSO], be distributed under section 754 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, shall be distributed as if section 754 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 had not been repealed by subsection (a). 
 
This means that putatively dumped goods imported on September 30, 2007, for 
example, will be subject to industry complaints as normal. If at the end of the many 
months of investigation and then negotiation, the treasury receives anti-dumping 
duties, it will still disperse half of the duties among the complaining U.S. companies 
according to the Byrd Amendment—even if it takes until early 2009, for example. 
This means that other countries will still be collecting countervailing duties from U.S. 
exports through 2008, and possibly beyond, regardless of the repeal on February 8, 
2006. 
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The companies hit by retaliatory duties have a natural ally in the 
foreign companies subject to antidumping duties in the United States 
who see their payments handed to their competition. Foreign 
companies suspect that the prospect of receiving a cut of eventual 
antidumping duties entices the U.S. companies to initiate complaints 
against them. In addition to the cost (and harassment) of defending 
antidumping audits, when their U.S. competitors succeed, all those 
duties go towards making the U.S. companies more formidable 
competitors. A handful of foreign dumpers hit by the double force of 
the CDSO have sued, alleging that the procedure unconstitutionally 
transforms remedial antidumping duties into a punitive measure.44 
Unfortunately, the Court of International Trade’s rejection of this 
argument creates a significant hurdle for a challenge by an “innocent” 
exporter.  
 
A. The Treaty Power 
 
The President and the Senate together have total control over the 
conduct of foreign affairs through treaties. The United States acceded 
to the Uruguay and Marrakesh accords by executive signature and the 
“advice and consent” of the Senate. In addition to the senate approval, 
GATT was implemented by federal statute.45 The added endorsement 
of the House makes its application to domestic as well as international 
affairs clearer than most Article II treaties.  
While the Constitution has little to say about how the United 
States behaves internationally, it certainly constrains government 
behavior at home, regardless of what a treaty may say. Treaties are 
agreements between states that may bear directly—even entirely—on 
foreign issues, but it is equally possible, and increasingly common, for 
international agreements to touch on domestic activities. For example, 
if the President agrees by treaty to limit factory emissions to certain 
amounts of sulfur compounds, then a government agency cannot 
license a factory that does not meet the requirements.46 If it were to do 
so, the agency could be sued for the harm caused. Likewise, an 
 
 
44 Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1362 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2002), aff’d, 322 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
45 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501–624 (1994). An exploration of self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties is omitted in this note because of the clarity of the implementing 
language. 
46 This assumes, for the sake of simplicity, that the hypothetical treaty was an 
Article II treaty, it received Senate advice and consent, and the treaty was self-
executing, or the enabling legislation followed. 
SPRING 2007 BYRD AMENDMENT 
187 
individual hunter could be fined by a U.S. court under an international 
wildlife protection treaty even if U.S. law did not specifically protect 
the species hunted.47 More correctly, the treaty is U.S. law. The 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that “the laws of the 
United States . . . and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the 
land.”48 It not only invalidates state laws that conflict with U.S. 
treaties,49 but elevates treaties to the stature of federal law.  
When the Supremacy Clause was conceived, treaties were 
evidently believed to be superior to federal statutes. As Thomas 
Jefferson wrote in 1790, “[a] treaty made by the President, with the 
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, is a law of the land, and a law 
of superior order, because it not only repeals past laws, but cannot 
itself be repealed by future ones.”50 However, no global police force 
will ensure compliance with international law, which leaves the force 
of “interest and honor,”51 or the prospect of military force, against the 
state in breach. As the United States became less fearful of a military 
response to its noncompliance with treaties,52 the Charming Betsy 
decision53 and the last-in-time canon allow the United States more 
 
 
47 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–35 (1920) (holding that even 
though Congress did not have the power to regulate the protection of migratory birds, 
the same affect was legitimately achieved through treaty). 
48 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
49 The obligatory reference is to Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), 
which laid to rest the belief that the peace treaty affirming debts with Great Britain 
was unenforceable because it was made by the Continental Congress, and, more to the 
point, established that the treaty overrode contrary subsequent state law.  
50 JOHN N. MOORE, TREATY INTERPRETATION, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 57 n.153 (2001) (citing THE JEFFERSONIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 880 (John P. Foley 
ed., Fundk & Wagnalls Company, 1900)).  
51 Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 
95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 313, 316 (2001) [hereinafter Vagts, Observance and Breach]. 
52 Id. at 327–28. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and 
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. 
L.J. 479, 492–93 (1998).  
53 The case that gave its name to the doctrine, Murray v. Schooner Charming 
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804), is sufficiently unremarkable in itself that a 
footnote is enough, as the doctrine was then, and continues still as a common law 
principle. An American ship was sold in the Caribbean islands and then captured by 
French privateers. Because of the hostilities between France and the United States, an 
American privateer subsequently captured the vessel believing it to be in violation of a 
law that prohibited “commercial intercourse between the United States and France, 
and the dependencies thereof.” The American claimed the right of salvage under U.S. 
law but Justice Marshall deferred to the international law customs in awarding the 
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flexibility in disavowing the “law of nations,” or at least in avoiding 
their effect in domestic courts. By 1888, the Supremacy Clause meant 
only that “a treaty [was] placed on the same footing, and made of like 
obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by [the 
Constitution] to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior 
efficacy is given to either over the other.”54 In 1889, the low water 
mark for the judicial enforcement of treaty observance followed with 
the Chinese Exclusion Case, where the Court held that the treaty was 
“the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the 
pleasure of Congress.”55 Whereas Jefferson would have believed that 
complying with an international agreement was a matter of the 
“honor” of the President and the nation, and renegotiation would be 
required to change its effect, a hundred years later it was established 
that the later conflicting act superseded. Thus, in the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, a federal law excluding Chinese workers prevailed 
over the pre-existing treaty. But a subsequent 1894 treaty allowing 
workers to return in limited circumstances prevailed over the 1888 
statute.56 
While it is clear that Congress can breach a treaty at its “pleasure,” 
the authority of treaties has not entirely decreased to that of legislative 
acts as Justice Field held in the Chinese Exclusion Case. When 
Congress enacts a statute in contradiction of a pre-existing law, the 
new statute typically acts as an amendment with the prior statute 
taking on a modified meaning. The inescapable analogy to contract 
principles illustrates why legislative treaty breach cannot be so fluid. 
In the treaty context, Congress acts as only one party to the “contract.” 
One party (Congress or another nation) may propose a modification to 
 
 
proceeds of the sale to the prior owner. The frequently-cited language that 
encapsulates the doctrine is as follows:  
 
It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to 
violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is 
warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country. 
These principles are believed to be correct, and they ought to 
be kept in view in construing the act now under consideration. 
 
Id. at 118. 
54 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
55 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 
600 (U.S. 1889).  
56 Vagts, supra note 51. 
SPRING 2007 BYRD AMENDMENT 
189 
the treaty, and conduct itself in according the change, but the other 
party is not bound without its consent. Further, just as a breach does 
not annihilate a contract, a breach will not necessarily end a treaty.57 
Thus, the fact that “a provision of an international agreement is 
superseded as domestic law does not relieve the United States of its 
international obligation.”58 Courts still hold to the goal of giving effect 
to both an international agreement and a statute.59 But in the event of a 
direct contradiction between the two, even though the domestic effect 
of an international obligation has been defeated by an act of Congress, 
the international obligation does not evaporate as it would if a treaty 
was only as binding as a legislative act. As Professor Drahozal 
expressed, “when Congress enacts a law overriding a provision of a 
treaty, the law may both eliminate the domestic effect of the treaty and 
violate international obligations under the treaty at the same time.”60  
This last-in-time construction has allowed Congress to deeply 
embarrass presidents and ambassadors.61 One of these cases, Diggs v. 
Shultz,62 raised the question of whether some international obligations 
were too important for Congress to override. Before Shultz, the Nixon 
administration had taken steps to ensure the United States’ compliance 
with a U.N. Security Counsel embargo against Southern Rhodesia’s 
racist government. The Byrd Amendment63 of 1971 prevented the 
President from enforcing the embargo on chrome ore because of cold 
war tensions. The Court rejected the argument that, because of the 
stature of Security Council Resolutions Congress’s circumvention of 
the embargo was ineffective.64 If the contravention of the agreements 
 
 
57 That is to say that treaty obligations are independent covenants—treaties differ 
from U.C.C. contract law in having no requirement for mutuality (among other 
significant differences). However, violation of treaty obligations may be considered 
material breach and entitle the other party(ies) to terminate the treaty. Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/ 
1_1_1969.pdf [hereinafter VCLT]. 
58 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, supra 
note 7, at § 115(1)(b). 
59 See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 143 (2005); F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). 
60 CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 163 (Jack Stark ed., 2004). 
61 See Vagts, supra note 51, at 329–32. 
62 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973). 
63 Armed Forces, Appropriation Authorization of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-156 § 
503, 85 Stat. 423. This time it was Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia.  
64 Diggs, 470 F.2d at 467 n.4. 
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touching a Chapter VII Security Counsel resolution was not outside 
Congress’ power, then breaching the antidumping agreements 
underpinning the WTO is likewise subject to Congress’s “pleasure.” 
The United States’ subordination of international obligations to 
domestic law (or politics) is not unique. With roots in British common 
law,65 this subordination remains, nevertheless, directly at odds with 
the core principles of international law. The maxim, pacta sunt 
servanda, requires observance of agreements. In international law, an 
agreement is not to be made lightly, and other parties should expect 
that it will be observed unless they should have known that the 
agreement would be contrary to domestic law.66 For example, any 
treaty partner should know that the President of the United States 
possesses no power under the Constitution to prevent the U.S. 
newspapers from criticizing that state because the First Amendment is 
known to be a fundamental restriction on government power. Well-
known, fundamental aspects of a state’s legal makeup excepted, the 
obligation to respect treaties transcends past and future domestic laws, 
in line with Jefferson’s conception—and exactly as the United States 
expects its treaty partners to behave. The Byrd Amendment brings the 
two universes of law into alignment: domestic U.S. law and 
international law. But pacta sunt servanda means that outside that 
shadow, international treaty obligations continue undiminished. 
In light of the historic status of international agreements, it is not 
surprising that U.S. courts have interposed a buffer between the 
rapidly shifting force of domestic legislation and the treaties. If the 
constitutionality of the CDSO requires courts to ignore the legal force 
of the GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement, domestic exporters harmed 
by it cannot rely on those international legal obligations in challenging 
it. In the WTO Appellate Body’s analysis, the CDSO clearly violated 
the GATT; but under Charming Betsy, the analysis followed different 
standards. As expressed by the Restatement, the last-in-time rule 
applies “if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or 
provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot 
be fairly reconciled.”67 This means that a court will try to give effect to 
 
 
65 Bradley, supra note 52, at 487–88. 
66 VCLT, supra note 57, arts. 27, 46 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of 
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”). 
67 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, supra 
note 7, § 115(1)(a). Since the Restatement’s publication, courts have treated the “or” 
as “and;” both intent and irreconcilability seem required now. 
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both treaty and statute if possible, and looks for clear assurances from 
Congress that a contradiction is not inadvertent. 
In the case of the 1971 Byrd Amendment, the D.C. Circuit found it 
abundantly clear from the legislative record that “no member of 
Congress voting on the measure was under any doubt about what was 
involved…it was as presented to the Congress...a measure that would 
make—and was intended to make—the United States a certain treaty 
violator.”68  
Of course, Congress is not always so unmistakably clear, and 
courts will traditionally strain to avoid finding “clear purpose” where 
possible.69 Perhaps the high water mark of the use of the last-in-time 
rule occurred in United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization,70 
where Congress attempted to force the closure of the PLO’s observer 
mission to the United Nations. Under the Headquarter Agreement 
between the United States and the United Nations,71 the United States 
agreed not only to host the United Nations, but also to accommodate 
delegates. In 1974, over the U.S. objections, the United Nations 
extended observer status to the PLO.72 However, in 1988, Congress 
declared the PLO a threat to U.S. security and legislated the closure of 
all its offices.73 While the court acknowledged that the Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 1988 had the “explicit purpose” of closing the PLO offices in 
the United States,74 it took advantage of the complete lack of 
substantive debate regarding the act and construed that it could give 
effect to both the treaty and the act. The court gave great weight to the 
longstanding of the Headquarters Agreement and its centrality to the 
U.N. system. While recognizing that Congress had the power to breach 
such a treaty, it insisted on preserving the obligation unless the “power 
[to breach was] clearly and unequivocally exercised.”75 The court gave 
 
 
68 Diggs, 470 F.2d at 466. 
69 See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
70 United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (D.N.Y. 1988).  
71 Agreement Between the United States and the United Nations Regarding the 
Headquarters of the United Nations, Pub. L. No. 80-357, 61 Stat. 756 (1947), 
available at http://www.un.int/usa/host_hqs.htm; see also 22 USCS § 287 (2000). 
72 PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1459. 
73 Whatever its effect, the law is still in force. 22 USCS § 5202 (2000). 
74 PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1460.  
75 Id, at 1465. While the “strong” clear statement rule seems justified by some 
language in the Charming Betsy line, such as in United States v. Cook, 288 U.S. 102, 
120 (1933), the length the court went to in the PLO decision was labeled by one 
commentator as following the minority doctrine on intent. James Englert, Congress, 
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effect to both the treaty and the statute by holding that the Anti-
Terrorism Act applied to any PLO offices in the United States not 
functioning under the Headquarter Agreement (for which, of course, 
there were none). Thus, despite the intended effect of the statute, this 
court held that U.S. law requires overt manifestation that Congress 
intends to override international obligations. Charming Betsy is 
referred to as the last-in-time rule, but a later act of Congress (such as 
the Anti-Terrorism Act) only displaces the domestic effect of 
international agreements when they unavoidably and intentionally 
conflict.  
Just like the 1988 Anti-Terrorism Act, the CDSO avoided 
committee hearings. When courts look for a clear congressional 
statement, they will at least find that it is unclear to what degree 
Congress understood the contradiction between the bills and U.S. 
treaty obligations.76 This lack of clarity allows—or requires—courts to 
construe the law to preserve the domestic effect of WTO obligations at 
the expense of the Byrd Amendment. The fact that the administration 
argued so thoroughly that the CDSO was in harmony with the 
Uruguay Round does not affect the analysis of congressional 
manifestation. Likewise, while the administration’s subsequent 
statements of the United States’ intention to comply with the WTO 
ruling77 indicate that the United States recognizes that it violated its 
treaty obligations, the acknowledgement does not enter into the 
Charming Betsy analysis. 
Inasmuch as PLO remains the current last-in-time doctrine,78 
under this “hallowed principle of American foreign relations law,”79 
the CDSO would not contradict the GATT. The Appellate Body’s 
decision clearly held that the existence of the CDSO was a violation of 
 
 
the PLO, the World Order and the Constitution: What’s a Court to Do?, 57 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1393, 1403–05 (1989). 
76 PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1470–71. See also Englert, supra note 75, at 1404. 
77 See Addenda to Status Report by the United States, supra note 42.  
78 As distinguished in Section B.2, infra, there are contexts in which the 
Supreme Court has instead followed the line of cases descending from Whitney v. 
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). See also Michael Franck, Note, The Future of 
Judicial Internationalism: Charming Betsy, Medellin v. Dretke, and the Consular 
Rights Disputes, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 515 (2006). However, such decisions as Allegheny 
Lublum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004), Roeder v. Iran, 
333 F.3d 228, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, 203 
F.3d 116, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2000) highlight the ongoing vitality of PLO’s reluctance to 
needlessly construe the abrogation of a treaty.  
79 Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT’L. L. 458, 
459 (1998). 
SPRING 2007 BYRD AMENDMENT 
193 
the U.S. commitments in the international realm. However, in the 
United States the absence of clear intent to violate the GATT means 
that the later-in-time action does not mechanically prevail. Just as in 
PLO, the senators could expect that the statute would have effect only 
to the extent the treaty did not govern.  
This means that the exclusionary provision in the Uruguay Round 
enacting language in 19 U.S.C. § 2504 (2000) would therefore not be 
implicated. It provides that “[n]o provision of any trade 
agreement...which is in conflict with any statute of the United States 
shall be given effect under the laws of the United States.” Without 
clear statement of intent from Congress, there could be no “conflict” 
under § 2405.80 Although the DSB Appellate Body eschewed 
legislative intent analysis,81 preferring the plain language approach, 
had legislative debate made it clear that the CDSO would conflict with 
WTO obligations, a clear violation would have arisen under both U.S. 
law and WTO policy. Because Congress attached the CDSO as a rider 
to the conference committee version of a must-pass agricultural 
appropriations bill, there was simply no opportunity to demonstrate the 
clear intent required under PLO. 
Can the legislature unilaterally violate a treaty? Yes. Congress has 
the power. U.S. law recognizes that although the treaty obligation still 
exists, Congress can nevertheless defeat the domestic effect of the 
obligation. Did Congress violate the treaty by applying the CDSO to 
antidumping duties from WTO members? Certainly, but the obligation 
continues under U.S. law. Absent explicit legislative intent, the CDSO 
does not extinguish WTO agreements, at home or abroad. So even 
under the last-in-time rule, the CDSO exists parallel to the 
unabrogated WTO agreements and both have effect in the U.S. courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 The Supreme Court recently declined to conduct a conflict analysis to reach 
the opposite result in Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União Do Vegetal, 
126 S. Ct 1211, 1224–25 (2006). The government’s assertion that U.S. drug 
enforcement treaties were important did not prevail over the U.S. statute’s built-in 
“compelling interest” standard. 
81 The Appellate Body chided the DSB panel with its quotation from the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Appellate Body Report, supra note 
20, ¶ 281.  
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B. Possible Causes of Action 
 
Non-states have no standing in international courts. The Statute of 
the International Court of Justice clearly provides that “only states 
may be parties in cases before the Court.”82 Likewise, in the WTO 
system, “only those Members that are parties…may participate in 
decisions or actions taken by the DSB,”83 and only states may be 
“Members.” Although the law of state responsibility has long 
protected individual aliens, and individuals are capable of breaching 
their nation’s obligations to another state, traditionally, no mechanism 
allows an individual to invoke international law—the state must 
espouse the claim or answer for the violation. Thus, although the 
United Nations can respond to complaints against states from non-
governmental organizations (on human rights issues), no international 
forum exists for an NGO—let alone an individual corporation—to 
seek redress under commercial international law.84  
Additionally, nations consent to claims by individual corporations 
through bilateral investment treaties. However, these treaties do not 
provide a forum for U.S. companies to sue the U.S. Government. 
Rather, corporations from one nation may only sue the other nation 
causing the harm. The EU, which is not a nation, has acted pursuant to 
the valid findings of an international legal body, so there is no cause of 
action against it. The U.S. companies have no international forum for 
their complaint, and ability to enforce any potential awards. Their only 
hope is U.S. law, whereby the CDSO is clearly a valid exercise of 
Congress’s commerce power.85 
The U.S. manufacturer subject to fifteen percent duties is crushed 
between the action of a domestically legal, albeit internationally illegal 
statute, and the undisputedly valid actions of the WTO. As the United 
States Treasury distributes legitimately collected antidumping duties to 
the industries affected by the dumping, the machine manufacturer is 
paying for the illegal “trade effect” through foreign taxes.  
 
 
82 Stat. of the Int’l Ct. of J., June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, art. 3. 
83 DSU art. 2.1. 
84 Duties do not fall under human rights law, the other branch of international 
law that concerns individual’s rights. It is in this area that the first steps towards 
creating a private cause of action against states are being made. Even though the 
European Court of Human Rights has the ability to hear the claims of individuals 
against states and has power to enforce its findings, the difficulty of satisfying 
admissibility (which is standing plus stating a cause of action) means that few claims 
ever succeed.  
85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824). 
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Section A demonstrated that the CDSO would only extinguish the 
domestic effect of international obligations if it were directly and 
deliberately in conflict with Congressional action. Since it does not 
supersede international law under the PLO standard, the CDSO must 
be reconciled with the broader international obligations. Just as the 
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1988 was confined to apply only to PLO 
missions other than the U.N.’s (where there were none), the CDSO 
would be logically confined to dispersing antidumping duties where it 
does not violate the AD and SCM Agreements,86 i.e., when they are 
collected from non-WTO Members. This theory is bolstered by the 
recent decision in the Court of International Trade reading such a 
limitation as to NAFTA Members. 
 
1. Candian Lumber v. United States 
 
Even though the WTO tribunals found that the incentives created 
by the CDSO did not per se violate AD and SCM agreements, 
domestic producers (and the trade law firms that represented them) 
certainly had a motive to bring dumping complaints against their 
foreign competitors. By 2002, the Department of Commerce found 
several Canadian industries were dumping on the U.S. market. Seeing 
millions of dollars paid to their U.S. competitors, the Canadian 
businesses brought Canadian Lumber Trade Association v. United 
States to block the application of the Byrd Amendment to Canadian 
goods based on the NAFTA implementation act and the 
Administrative Procedures Act.87 
 
 
86 The DSB Appellate Body report called the Byrd Amendment an illegal 
incentive for companies to initiate antidumping complaints (see supra II.C.4). The 
elimination of this finding in the Appellate Body report makes reconciling WTO 
obligations and the CDSO much simpler. While the DSB Panel stated, “We find it 
difficult to conceive of any method which would be more appropriate and/or effective 
than the repeal of the CDSOA measure,” (Panel Report, supra note 10, at 8.6) the 
Appellate report merely “request[ed] the United States bring the CDSOA into 
conformity with its obligations” (Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, at 319). The 
restriction required by the Charming Betsy canon achieves this effect, preventing 
unauthorized specific action against dumping or subsidization. 
87 25 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006). The time for appeal has not yet 
passed because a final judgment on remedy has not yet issued. Id. at 133–34. Because 
several billion dollars are still being held in special CDSO accounts, the repeal of the 
Byrd amendment will not likely discourage an appeal. There is a chance, however, 
that negotiations between the United States and Canada on the larger issue of the 
Department of Commerce’s dumping finding, will settle the issue without the help of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Ontario Forest Prod. Ass’n v. United 
States, 2006 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 123 at *28. 
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Canada was a complaining party in the dispute before the WTO 
where they were the voice for Canadian companies who could not sue 
under the GATT AD Agreement themselves. NAFTA, on the other 
hand, requires member countries to grant foreign importers access to 
courts to directly contest adverse determinations. Therefore, although 
Canada joined the complaint, its status and interest were not identical 
to the Canadian producers. 
On the merits, the Court of International Trade found in favor of 
the Canadian producers, not by invalidating the CDSO in toto, but by 
finding that it did not apply to the companies from NAFTA countries. 
This judicially mandated redaction operated the same as Charming 
Betsy acted in the PLO case in tailoring the CDSO’s effect. 
Nevertheless, this was not a Charming Betsy decision, for that 
common law principle had been negotiated into NAFTA at 
§ 1902(2)(a), which stated that an “amendment [to a NAFTA party’s 
antidumping law or countervailing duty law] shall apply to goods from 
another Party only if the amending statute specifies that it applies to 
goods from that Party or from the Parties to this Agreement.” 
Accordingly, the doctrine was enacted in the United States as Section 
408 of the NAFTA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3438. It provides, 
“Any amendment enacted after [NAFTA] enters into force . . . to . . . 
the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.), or any successor 
statute . . . shall apply to goods from a NAFTA country only to the 
extent specified in the amendment.” 
Due to the incorporation of these principles into the implementing 
language, the Canadian Lumber decision was a simpler express-
language analysis than most Charming Betsy decisions. Instead of 
express-language serving simply as a guide88 to legislative intent, the 
court held that § 408 required “magic words”89 expressly including 
NAFTA parties in the CDSO. As such language was patently absent 
from the CDSO, the court concluded: 
 
In sum, essentially, the Byrd Amendment converts 
what was just a tariff into a broader compensatory 
regime. Certainly, this change in the nature of the 
remedies available under the trade laws is something 
Section 408 is meant to foreclose as to Canadian and 
Mexican goods where Congress has not explicitly 
 
 
88 Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
89 Canadian Lumber, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 1333–34.  
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stated an intent to change the statutory remedies as to 
Canada and Mexico.90 
 
Section 408 made the merits of Canadian Lumber quite clear, but even 
without it, the last-in-time rule should have led to the same result. That 
this provision was specially implemented (where, for example, the 
other elements of § 1902(2) are not) indicated that negotiators were 
not willing to rely on the common law to protect their rights.91 At the 
very least, Canadian Lumber provided a model remedy for foreign 
importers as well as domestic exporters harmed by retaliation, a model 
that many would like to see extended to WTO Members. 
 
2. Extending the exclusion to all WTO members 
 
Section 408 of the NAFTA Implementation Act—and its intent to 
prevent inadvertent impairment of the NAFTA partnership—applies to 
amendments, like the Byrd Amendment that changed antidumping 
and/or countervailing duty law after NAFTA’s enactment. In general, 
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1904, represents the 
contrary presumption that “[n]o provision of any trade agreement 
approved by Congress under [the act] nor the application of any such 
provision to any person or circumstance, which is in conflict with any 
statute of the United States shall be given effect under the laws of the 
United States.”92 As this runs counter to the international law doctrine 
of pacta sunt servanda and the standard of observance the United 
States expects of its trading partners, this language appears out of 
place (and somewhat arrogant). However, because the Charming Betsy 
standard for conflict requires direct, even express, conflict before 
§ 2504 should apply; most trade agreements are not affected. 
In addition to the baseline standard of § 2504, both the NAFTA 
and Uruguay Round implementation statutes contain their own 
subordination clauses, § 3312(a) and § 3512(a), respectively. “No 
provision of the Agreement, nor the application of any such provision 
to any person or circumstance, which is inconsistent with any law of 
 
 
90 Id. at 1370. 
91 It is also possible that the doctrine was not common among the NAFTA 
parties so the United States’ inclusion of a statutory provision was merely a reiteration 
setting a good example.  
92 19 U.S.C. § 2504 (2000) (emphasis added).  
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the United States shall have effect.”93 Even the substitution of the 
broader standard of “inconsistency” instead of “conflict” does not 
break the Charming Betsy analysis. Whereas the last-in-time rule (and 
§ 2504) would presume inconsistencies were inadvertent oversights, 
perhaps the use of “inconsistent” suggests Congress’s expectation of 
greater flexibility to adjust the United States’ trade practice based on 
internal concerns and to be free from external restraints.94 However, in 
the Court of International Trade’s opinion in Canadian Lumber, any 
distinction was lost and the court explained how to “reconcile” 
inconsistency: “[l]imit the reach of the Byrd Amendment to non-
NAFTA goods.”95  
Canadian Lumber was an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
action to enjoin agency action inconsistent with statute. An APA claim 
brought by domestic importers would not fail on § 2504(a) or 
§ 3512(a) if the court applied the Charming Betsy rule of 
interpretation. Nevertheless, the fact that the clash of a treaty and 
statute arose pursuant to a decision by an international tribunal added 
another layer to the analysis. Under international law, decisions from a 
tribunal designated to interpret treaty obligations are authoritative 
statements as to the meaning of treaty obligations,96 just as national 
courts authoritatively interpret national statutes and constitutions.97 
Whereas bodies like the International Court of Justice are in the 
difficult position of dictating the conduct of sovereign states in highly 
 
 
93 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). The GATT version has one 
grammatical change: “No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the 
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance that is inconsistent 
with any law of the United States shall have effect.” 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (2000). 
94 Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(noting that trade laws are not exempt from the Charming Betsy principle). 
95 425 F. Supp. 2d at 1370. The significance here is the willingness to resolve 
inconsistency instead of treating § 3312(a) as cutting off the court’s efforts to 
harmonize statute and treaty. In Canadian Lumber, the potential inconsistency was 
between § 408 (a rule of construction) and the Byrd Amendment (a substantive act, 
silent on construction). In the case of the Uruguay Agreement’s AD and CSM 
provisions with the Byrd Amendment, both are substantive. Nevertheless, the 
reasoning still holds because, arguably, the § 408 vs. Byrd clash is in how to give 
effect to the intentions of Congress. In both cases the court’s task is to determine 
whether there is sufficient indication that Congress expected their bill to contravene 
U.S. treaty obligations.  
96 See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 7, art. 
36(2)(a); U.N. CHARTER art. 94. 
97 It is also true—and this is the distinction with common law systems—that 
even ICJ opinions lack precedential force as to situations and states not party to a 
decision.  
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political situations,98 the WTO dispute resolution panels and appellate 
bodies simply allow self-help suspension of concessions. Decisions are 
more practical to implement because the prevailing party always holds 
the reins.99 
Whatever status they have in international law, international 
tribunals weigh less in the U.S. jurisprudence than would logically 
follow from their authoritative role in defining treaty obligations. The 
United States is not alone100 in allowing a disconnection between the 
effect of decisions on the international plane and the domestic force of 
those same decisions, but it has a reputation of dealing with this 
disconnection in a manner that is “confused, unsystematic, and ad 
hoc.”101 This is not because there is no black-letter standard, Breard v. 
Greene states that the U.S. courts “should give respectful 
consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered 
by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such.”102 In 
Timken Company v. United States,103 when a foreign importer 
challenged the Department of Commerce’s dumping calculations after 
the WTO found a particular methodology contrary to the AD/SCM 
Agreements, the “respectful consideration” granted was very weak 
indeed. Yet, whereas Timken’s zeroing challenge came up against both 
statute and reasonable agency interpretation, a challenge to the CDSO 
after the WTO’s decision would not trigger the resistance that Timken 
met. 
In Timken, the courts did not defer to WTO Appellate Body 
interpretation of the treaty, but instead on a distinguishable factor in 
the situation contemplated for domestic exporters under the CDSO. 
Prior to the WTO affirmatively finding that the United State’s practice 
of “zeroing”104 was inconsistent with the GATT in Timken, the Court 
 
 
98 See Christina Tomuschat, International Courts and Tribunals, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONALS LAW 1108, 1113 (R. Bernhardt ed, 1995). 
99 See DSU arts. 3(2), 19, 22. 
100 See generally Martin A. Rogoff, Application of Treaties and the Decisions of 
International Tribunals in the United States and France: Reflections on Recent 
Practice, 58 ME. L. REV. 405 (2006). 
101 Id. at 413. 
102 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (overriding the ICJ’s 
interpretation of the Vienna Convention due to established U.S. due process 
provisions). 
103 345 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
104  “Zeroing” is shorthand for the practice of basing dumping findings on 
weighted-average dumping margins. The Department of Commerce treats as zero 
those transactions where a company’s (or industry’s) dumping margin was less than 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 3 
200 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the practice as a reasonable 
interpretation of statute.105 The Japanese importer had asserted a 
Charming Betsy claim on the plain language of the GATT combined 
with the WTO decision finding the EC’s zeroing practice inconsistent 
with its AD/SMC Agreements.106 As the decision was between the EC 
and India, the court found it significant that the WTO was not 
analyzing the U.S.’s practice. Thus, the WTO’s analysis was not 
“sufficiently persuasive to find Commerce’s practice unreasonable.”107 
Timken seems to have inoculated the Department of Commerce 
from further challenges even after the WTO decisions in United 
States.108 The Federal Circuit in Corus Staal109 chose to read Timken as 
a repudiation of WTO’s jurisdiction. Selectively quoting Timken, 
Corus Staal asserted definitively, “WTO decisions are not binding on 
the United States, much less this court.”110 While the Court was of 
course correct in saying that “[n]either the GATT nor any enabling 
international agreement outlining compliance therewith (e.g., the 
[ADA Agreement]) trump[ed] domestic legislation,” it ignored the 
last-in-time principles in relying on § 3512(a). So much so that the 
correct reason for dismissing the importer’s arguments (for reasons 
discussed shortly), namely 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g), was merely an 
afterthought in a string cite.111  
In hitchhiking on its Timken decision, the Federal Circuit truncated 
its analysis and failed to ground itself in the “respectful consideration” 
standard.112 The Supreme Court recently explained the rationale and 
meaning of that standard in terms of jurisdiction in Sanchez-Llamas v. 
 
 
zero and makes its findings based only on the dumped goods. When applied, this 
technique inexorably results in a greater aggregate than if dumped transactions are 
offset by those transactions where there was no dumping. 
105 Id. at 1342. 
106 Id. at 1333–34. See Appellate Body Report, E.C.—Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001).. . .  
107 354 F.3d at 1344. 
108 Sunset Review of Anti-dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel 
Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2003); Final Dumping 
Determination On Softwood Lumber From Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 
2004). 
109 Corus Staal BV v. Department of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(frequently called Corus Staal II). 
110 Id. at 1348 (internal citations omitted). 
111 See also Timken, 354 F.3d at 1345 (stopping its analysis before explaining § 
3533 because it had already decided on Chevron principles § 3512(a)).  
112 See Breard, 523 U.S. at 371. 
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Oregon decision.113 Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion recited, 
“‘The judicial Power of the United States’ is ‘vested in one supreme 
Court . . . and . . . inferior courts,’ and that ‘power . . . extends to . . .  
treaties.’”114 Chief Justice Roberts further stated, “If treaties are to be 
given effect as federal law, determining their meaning as a matter of 
federal law is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department.”115 Given that the “one supreme court” endorsed 
Charming Betsy, Robert’s statement does not intend to displace 
international tribunals. Instead, Roberts’s statement simply means that 
until the Court repudiates the last-in-time principles, federal courts 
should give meaning to the law of nations unless directly contradicted 
by Congressional action.116 It is not a dereliction of the Constitutional 
duty to be influenced by courts that—by U.S. agreement—interpret the 
U.S. treaties. It is giving effect to a long standing federal doctrine that 
Congress has shown that it knows how to reconcile its legal 
obligations and override these obligations for domestic purposes.117 
Rejecting international tribunals is not asserting the jurisdiction of the 
U.S. courts, but simply abandoning a domestic canon in the name of 
jingoism.  
While it is understandable that “nationalist legal theorists are wary 
of ceding decision-making power to officials who are not accountable 
to the American electorate in the way envisaged by their vision of the 
Constitution,”118 Charming Betsy already deals with conflicting 
sovereignty by allowing Congress to override (when it is clear) the 
domestic effect of a treaty that is incompatible with U.S. law. Disdain 
for the encroachment of international tribunals is misplaced given this 
established, built-in safeguard, especially when the United States is 
 
 
113 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). Even though much of Sanchez-Llamas deals with the 
effect of a treaty on Oregon’s state practice, the analysis of the role of international 
tribunals is no different from and is more recent than the discussion in Breard and 
others. 
114 Id. at 2864 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III §§ 1–2). 
115 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
116 There is no danger of, in the words of the Federal Circuit, an international 
decision being treated as “proxy for independent analysis.” Cummins Inc. v. United 
States, 454 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
117 Also see other cases in the long tradition of clear statement rules. E.g., 
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005); Lockhart v. United 
States, 546 U.S. 142 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 
210 (1955); Great N. R. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908). 
118 Rogoff, supra note 100, at 431. 
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already the dominant player at the negotiating table for any 
international treaty.119 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s eagerness to disregard foreign 
tribunals and Robert’s posturing in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, other 
elements of that opinion support honoring Charming Betsy and 
invalidating the Byrd Amendment. In deciding that “respectful 
consideration” of the tribunal (the ICJ) in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon 
allowed rejecting its decision, the Court was influenced by the nature 
of the remedies contemplated and the position taken by the executive 
on the agreement.120 The Court observed that the ICJ’s enforcement 
power came through the United Nations Security Council and thus 
“contemplate[d] quintessentially international remedies.”121 Security 
Council enforcement, as it is tied up with geopolitical power brokering 
and collective state action, represents an extreme of the international 
relations spectrum. At another extreme are the transaction-by-
transaction assessments of countervailing duties by the states that 
prevail in WTO disputes. Some WTO obligations are enforced abroad, 
and others play out, as NAFTA actions do, in domestic courts and 
before domestic administrative agencies. All this suggests that the 
obligations undertaken under the GATT contemplate the treatment of 
individual companies in the national system even though the 
obligation at issue in Sanchez-Llamas, the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, contemplated a specific optional enforcement 
mechanism far removed from the police officers or even municipalities 
who implement Article 36(1)(c).122 Congress’s simple ratification of 
 
 
119 See generally John E. Noyes, American Hegemony, U.S. Political Leaders, 
and General International Law, 19 Conn. J. Int’l L. 293, 296 (2004); Jurgen Kurtz, A 
General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11 of NAFTA and 
the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 713, 716 
(2002) (putting the U.S. among dominant forces in global investment). 
120 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685. 
121 Id. (emphasis in original). 
122  That section provides as follows: 
 
(1) With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions 
relating to nationals of the sending State: 
 
 * * * 
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of 
the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to 
converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal 
representation. They shall also have the right to visit any 
national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or 
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the Vienna Convention (even though it is deemed to be self-executing) 
and statutory implementation of the GATT indicate the vast 
differences between the two agreements. Whereas the Vienna 
Convention’s posture cuts against honoring the ICJ’s interpretation, 
the nature of GATT obligations weighs in favor of honoring WTO 
dispute settlement process in the U.S. courts. 
In addition, the distinction between the executive’s treatment of 
the two treaties weighs strongly in favor of weakening the CDSO. 
Whereas the Bush administration affirmatively repudiated the 
enforcement protocol to the Vienna Convention specifically to avoid 
ICJ interpretation, both the Clinton and Bush administrations criticized 
the Byrd Amendment. Administration attorneys repeatedly asserted 
their intention to comply with the WTO DSB decision and pledged to 
repeal the CDSO, which they eventually accomplished. “Respectful 
consideration” means much more in this instance because, “while 
courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the 
departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation 
and enforcement is given great weight.”123 
Due to this affirmation that Charming Betsy still has vitality, we 
return to the internal limitations imposed by the implementation 
language to an APA suit to bring the interpretation of agency conduct 
in line with the United States’ international obligations.124 As alluded 
to above, 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g) represents exactly the type of language 
that overcomes the Charming Betsy presumption that Congress does 
not violate international agreements. The multi-tiered scheme makes 
clear Congress’s intent to interrupt the interpretation of the treaty by 
the WTO dispute settlement system. The statute provides that the U.S. 
 
 
detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. 
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking 
action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or 
detention if he expressly opposes such action. 
 
Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261. 
123 The Court of International Trade observed the following in one of its Corus 
Staal decisions: 
Had the Government appeared here saying it had lost in the WTO, 
with respect to this very administrative determination, and it had 
complied with the entire statutory framework, to the effect that it 
was reversing its position, even as to a past determination, then 
the court would have to consider what to do. 
 
 Corus Staal BV v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (2005).  
124 Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset, 19 C.F.R. § 159.61–64 (2005). 
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“practice may not be amended, rescinded, or otherwise modified in the 
implementation of” a WTO DSB report until the United States 
completed its own reexamination.125 Section 3533(g)(1) sets up a 
lengthy review process, making it clear that the domestic effect of a 
WTO DSB decision is not automatic. The review process proceeds as 
follows: first, consultations between the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), the agency, relevant congressional 
committees, and the private sector; then notice and comment, followed 
by publication of the modification and its explanation in the Federal 
Register; and finally another round of consultation between the USTR, 
agency, and relevant congressional committees regarding 
 
 
125 The statute reads: 
  
§ 3533 Dispute settlement panels and procedures 
 
   * * * 
 
(g)  Requirements for agency action 
 
(1) Changes in agency regulations or practice 
In any case in which a dispute settlement panel or the 
Appellate Body finds in its report that a regulation or 
practice of a department or agency of the United States is 
inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 
that regulation or unless and until— 
(A) the appropriate congressional committees have been 
consulted under subsection (f) of this section; 
(B) the Trade Representative has sought advice regarding 
the modification from relevant private sector advisory 
committees established under section 2155 of this title; 
(C) the head of the relevant department or agency has 
provided an opportunity for public comment by publishing 
in the Federal Register the proposed modification and the 
explanation for the modification; 
(D) the Trade Representative has submitted to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report describing 
the proposed modification, the reasons for the 
modification, and a summary of the advice obtained under 
subparagraph (B) with respect to the modification; 
(E) the Trade Representative and the head of the relevant 
department or agency have consulted with the appropriate 
congressional committees on the proposed contents of the 
final rule or other modification; and 
(F) the final rule or other modification has been published 
in the Federal Register. 
 
19 U.S.C. § 3533 (2000). 
SPRING 2007 BYRD AMENDMENT 
205 
implementation of the new determination. By the time Corus Staal’s 
challenge of zeroing came before the Court of International Trade 
(CIT) again in 2005, this process had clearly started,126 which 
indicated that the United States intended on complying with the GATT 
as interpreted by the DSB. Nevertheless, as the full process was 
incomplete, the CIT lacked the power to short-circuit it by enforcing 
the GATT over the statute. The statute was enacted with an 
understanding of treaty interpretation canons, and when it comes to the 
WTO, Congress knows how to interrupt those canons when it wishes. 
Section 3533(g) likewise applies to the Department of Commerce 
and the CDSO, but whereas the calculation of dumping margins is the 
role of the Department of Commerce, which is shielded by § 3533, the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) plays a fundamental role in 
Byrd payments but is explicitly excluded from the scheme blocking 
the effect of DSB reports in § 3533(g)(4).127 Instead, § 3538 applies 
specifically to the ITC’s “administrative action following WTO panel 
reports” and allows for a discretionary reporting procedure triggered 
by the USTR. Although it structured § 3538 as an optional route, 
Congress did not provide for anything, as the restriction “may not be 
amended, rescinded, or otherwise modified” that applies to all other 
agencies. Thus, even though the ITC is just one link in the chain of 
Byrd distributions, if the ITC does not fulfill its role, the Byrd 
distributions cannot be made.128 Whereas the barrier to implementing 
 
 
126 387 F. Supp 2d. at 1299. 
127 The pertinent part of the § 3533’s Dispute settlement panels and procedures 
reads: 
 
(g) Requirements for agency action 
 
* * * 
(4) Inapplicability to ITC 
This subsection does not apply to any regulation or practice of the 
International Trade Commission. 
 
19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(4) (2000). 
128 The threshold questions for standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) are whether (1) 
the U.S. exporter is injured in fact by the agency’s illegal action, (2) their situation is 
in the “zone of interest” intended to be protected by the provision the agency has 
violated, and (3) the court can provide relief. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. 
Orgs.. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). While it has been long established that customs 
regulations fall under the APA, it is another matter for exporters to demonstrate that 
theirs is a class intended to be protected. Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 43 Cust. 
Ct. 627 (1959) (including antidumping decisions within the scope of even the APA’s 
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DSB reports by most agencies is to “ensure that any modifications to 
regulatory practice as well as statutory changes to comply with dispute 
settlement findings are made with the full knowledge of the 
Congress,”129 Congress exerts less oversight upon the ITC130 because 
of its special role in trade policy and negotiations. 
Given that the Byrd amendment “ought never to be construed to 
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains,”131 courts could enjoin the ITC from continuing to cause the 
United States to violate the law of nations when the other possible 
construction demonstrated by Canadian Lumber remains.132 
Prior APA challenges based on WTO DSB reports in Corus Staal 
failed on two grounds: (1) the Federal Circuit’s affirmative finding 
that Department of Commerce’s practice demonstrated a reasonable 
application of the statute, was based on reasoning prior to the WTO 
DSB report; and (2) the language of § 3533(g) indicated that a DSB 
report could not modify agency practice. Neither of those elements 
applies to the CDSO. On the strength of all the legal and policy 
reasons stated above, the Byrd Amendment should be construed to not 
apply to WTO members.  
 
 
procedural requirements) rev’d on other grounds 296 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1960) 
(leaving the Customs Court’s reasoning untouched but finding the contention could 
not be raised for the first time on appeal). The Byrd Amendment is concerned about 
protecting domestic markets even at the expense of the class of U.S. exporters. Far 
from being a protected class, U.S. exporters are a class whose interests were strikingly 
absent from the Byrd Amendment’s zone of protection. While the supremacy clause 
certainly does nothing to exclude the theoretical possibility of a private cause of action 
based on international law, courts are reluctant to give weight to the claims. 
Specifically, just as criminal statutes do not usually create a private cause of action, 
the existence of a fully binding international law may simply not have been intended 
to be privately enforceable. Given the existence of the WTO’s own enforcement 
mechanism, U.S. courts would not permit private companies to enforce WTO 
obligations themselves. 
129 H.R. REP. NO 103-826, pt. 1, at 33 (1994). 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d) (2000) states 
that this report, the statement of administrative action, “shall be regarded as an 
authoritative expression by the United States concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Uruguay Round Agreements and this Act [the Uruguay Round 
Agreement Act] in any judicial proceeding in which a question arises concerning such 
interpretation or application.” 
130 See 19 U.S.C. § 3004 (2000) (the president makes changes to the HTSUS by 
proclamation—not through Congressional ratification); 19 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000) (the 
ITC makes recommendations on changes to HTSUS to the President while ensuring 
harmony with negotiations and the GATT); S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 26 (1994) (linking 
ITC policies to USTR positions rather than Congress’). 
131 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
132 See supra pp. 29–30. 
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3. The Takings clause 
 
The vitality of Charming Betsy jurisprudence is all the more 
important given the difficulty the innocent domestic exporters 
experience in gaining protection under constitutional arguments based 
on takings or illegitimate taxation. The takings clause might be 
implicated because the regulatory effect of the CDSO is to take money 
from certain U.S. companies, like the hypothetical machinery 
manufacturer/exporter, and give it to other U.S. companies threatened 
by foreign dumping, like the bearing industry. It is arguably 
unimportant that the money passes through, the EU, for example. By 
virtue of the Byrd Amendment, every time bearing manufacturers 
receive payouts from EU anti-dumping duties, machinery 
manufacturers must pay a proportional amount. As soon as the 
distributions stop, the retaliatory duties will stop as well.133 Thus, 
causation is both direct and proportional: the Byrd tax goes into effect 
as soon as the U.S. Treasury distributes antidumping duties charged to 
a company from a WTO member.  
What would be a taking if the federal government performed it 
directly is no less a taking because it is carried out—pursuant to 
legislative authority—by another entity. The problem is not who is 
empowered to conduct the taking, but whether it meets the Fifth 
Amendment’s conditions. The taking must be for “public use” and 
“just compensation” and it must be paid to the property owner for the 
loss.134 In the case of the CDSO, a successful claim on either condition 
would suffice, for if the CDSO were to fail on “public use” ground, the 
taking would be enjoined,135 and were it to pass as a “public use,” then 
the taking would be compensable. Compensation would be equivalent 
to the readily ascertainable duty, and the effect of the taking would be 
eliminated. 
 
 
 
133  “In this case, the level of suspension of concessions will automatically 
depend on the amount of disbursements made under the CDSOA in a given year. If 
this amount decreases, so will the level of suspension of concessions or other 
obligations that the Requesting Parties will be entitled to impose. If no disbursements 
are made, the level of suspension will have to be ‘zero.’” Recourse to Arbitration by 
the United States, United States–Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
¶ 4.24, WT/DS217/ARB/EEC (August 31, 2004); DSU art. 22.8. 
134 E.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231–32 (2003). 
135 E.g., Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1991) (reinforcing that 
a taking for purely private use is unconstitutional no matter the amount of just 
compensation given). 
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CDSO Payments to the Top Five Companies and to the 
Remaining Companies in Fiscal Years 2001-2004136 
 
  
In September 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GOA) 
analyzed the effect of the CDSO in light of the retaliatory duties. One 
of the report’s major criticisms137 stated that although 770 companies 
received some portion of the one billion dollars of the Byrd 
Amendment distributions at the date of the report, the “payments ha[d] 
been highly concentrated in a few companies.”138 The fact that the 
distributions remained so concentrated among so few companies and 
industries calls into question whether the Byrd Amendment is for 
“public use.” The GOA’s graph illustrates the geometric decline in the 
portion of distributions.139 While innocent manufacturers have not 
 
 
136 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ISSUES AND 
EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT 29, 
GAO-05-979 (2005). 
137 Another criticism was the administrative monster that the Department created 
to process accusations of dumping and then evaluate statements of “qualifying 
expenditure.” If the Canadian Softwood Lumber dispute pending at the CIT is 
sustained, the (illegal) distribution of billions of dollars of treasury money will be an 
unprecedented burden—first on the treasury, and then on innocent companies 
exporting to Canada who will have to make up that amount in retaliatory payments. 
138 ISSUES AND EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND 
SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT, supra note 136, at 28. 
139 Timken (who received 20% of distributions on the graph) acquired the 
Torrington Company (13%) in 2003, Timken-About Us, http://www.timken.com/ 
aboutus/history/, and is the parent company MPB (5%) for a combined total of 38%. 
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sued to stop enforcement of the Byrd Amendment, many eligible 
distribution recipients have sued for a greater share of the largesse.140 
Nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” requirement is not 
based on any formula, and, in this case, does not require a whole 
industry to benefit.141 The focus is the scope of applicability, not the 
actual short term benefit. A taking does not “fail to be public upon the 
ground that the immediate enjoyment of it is limited to a small group 
or even to a single person.”142 Given that “public use” is broadly 
construed in deference to legislators, and as nothing indicates that 
benefit aims a “particular class of identifiable individuals,” the Byrd 
Amendment is unlikely to conflict with the “public use” requirement, 
however skewed the payouts are.143 
Without the possibility of enjoining the taking for lack of public 
purpose, the companies subject to retaliatory duties must seek 
compensation for the appropriation of their property. The Byrd 
Amendment is a “shifting of an economic opportunity from the owner 
to third parties,” which is the essence of a taking.144 In the case of 
machinery exports to the EU, the shifting is at the rate of fifteen 
percent, but some dairy products exported to Mexico, for example, are 
subject to a thirty percent duty;145 at that rate, exportation costs 
become such a burden that the interference eclipses the benefits of sale 
and harms the industry.146 
 
 
ISSUES AND EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET 
ACT, supra note 136, at 29 n.39. 
140 See, e.g., Cathedral Candle Co. v. United States, 400 F.3d 1352 (2005). 
141 Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (“it is not 
essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, should directly 
enjoy or participate in any improvement in order to constitute a public use”). 
142 United States v. Boyle, 52 F. Supp. 906 (D. Ohio 1943). 
143 Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984); Kelo v. City of 
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
144 William P. Barr et al., The Gild that is Killing the Lily: How Confusion over 
Regulatory Takings Doctrine is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings 
Clause, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 438 (2005). 
145 Decreto por el que se modifica temporalmente el artículo 1 del Decreto por el 
que se establece la Tasa Aplicable durante 2003, del Impuesto General de 
Importación, par las mercancías originarias de América del Norte, publicado el 31 de 
diciembre do 2002, por lo que respecta a las mercancías originarias de EE.UU. 
[Decree Temporarily Modifying Import Duties for Goods Originating in the U.S.A.], 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], art. 1, 17 de agosto de 2005 (Mex.) available 
at http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/dof/2005/agosto/dof_17-08-2005.pdf. 
146 Press Release, Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition, Mexico to 
Impose $21 Million in Retaliatory Tariffs Against U.S. Exports; CITAC Says Byrd 
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The problem with a Fifth Amendment challenge is that because 
the subject of the taking is merchandise in commerce, the putative 
taking is manifested in transaction costs on one end and subsidies on 
the other. Even though the effect is clearly “a law that takes property 
from A and gives it to B,”147 the transfer is accomplished by taking a 
fractional value of property in a way that looks like a tax. While the 
takings clause would render useless a law requiring a (machinery) 
company to write a check to another (bearing) company, Congress 
could accomplish the same thing if it broke the transfer into two steps 
with the taxing power. The taxing power trumps the takings clause 
when the two seem to overlap because the taxing power would be 
meaningless if the collection of taxes was a compensable taking, or 
essentially, “the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring 
upon the one hand a taxing power and taking the same power 
away.”148 
  
4. The power to tax is subject to very weak standards  
 
Congress clearly possesses the power to either incentivize or 
discourage behavior through taxation. For example, if it desires to 
discourage tobacco consumption, it can increase the applicable tax 
rate. Congress could choose to make smoking prohibitively expensive 
without exceeding its discretion. The maxim from McCullough is “the 
power to tax involves the power to destroy.”149 Likewise, if it chooses 
to grant special incentives to any industry, Congress has great latitude 
within its power to act for the “general welfare.” However, the 
arbitrary way U.S. exporters are subjected to “Byrd tax” combined 
with the tiny portion of companies that receive distributions might 
mean that it does not advance the general welfare. Nevertheless, the 
legal standard is very low; only the clearest corruption would exceed 
the taxing and spending power:  
 
[the dominance of the taxing power over the Fifth 
Amendment] would have no application in a case 
where[,] although there was a seeming exercise of the 
taxing power, the act complained of was so arbitrary as 
 
 
Amendment Must Be Repealed (Aug. 18, 2005), http://www.citac.info/press/release/ 
2005/08_18.php. 
147 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 386, 388 (1798). 
148 Brushaber v. Union P.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916). 
149 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 431 (1819). 
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to constrain to the conclusion that it was not the 
exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property, that 
is, a taking of the same in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, or, what is equivalent thereto, was so 
wanting in basis for classification as to produce such a 
gross and patent inequality as to inevitably lead to the 
same conclusion.150 
 
While the companies paying retaliatory duties may feel subjected to 
“gross and patent inequality,” the Byrd Amendment only has to meet a 
rational standard. As explained in part III.B.1., it even meets the 
higher requirements of “public use.”  
Arguably, allowing other governments’ legislators to choose 
which U.S. industries pay for the Byrd Amendment subsidies is the 
apogee of caprice. However, what looks like a capricious and arbitrary 
exertion of the taxing power is clearly acceptable in light of the 
Charming Betsy canon of treaty reconciliation because, under the PLO 
standard, a court would look for unequivocal intent to repudiate a 
treaty, and it would give effect to both the U.S. treaty obligation and 
the Byrd Amendment. Regarding the treaty obligation, the only 
mechanism an exporter subject to retaliatory duties posesses to 
challenge the Byrd distributions is to follow the Canadian Lumber 
model and seek an injunction against the distributions from WTO 
members under the APA. To the degree that penalties involve the 
WTO and foreign governments, a court must give effect to the United 
States’ acceptance of WTO mechanisms and leave its treaty obligation 
intact. If courts ignore the policies of Charming Betsy, innocent 
exporters can never prevail against what is facially a clear exercise of 
commerce power, and what is in substance an unassailable exercise of 
the taxing power. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Innocent exporters are trapped between international law and U.S. 
law.151 Thus, if courts overextend Sanchez-Llamas and other decisions 
in that vein by turning their backs on Charming Betsey, the only forum 
 
 
150 Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24–25. 
151  “[T]he conduct of foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the 
political departments of the Federal Government; . . . the propriety of the exercise of 
that power is not open to judicial inquiry.” United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222–
23 (1942). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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for innocent exporters penalized by the CDSO subsidies will be 
Congress. As the CDSO distributions increase, and whatever the 
Appellate report found about incentives152 all predictions say they 
must,153 so will the retaliatory payments charged to innocent exporters. 
Whether or not exporters could get relief from courts, the WTO hopes 
that they will convince U.S. legislators to stop letting other 
governments take from A so that Congress can give to B. As the effect 
of the determination by the WTO Appellate body that the CDSO 
violated international agreements is not controlled by the doctrines in 
Sanchez-Llamas, innocent exporters should be able to rely on a 
resuscitation of the traditional last-in-time rules to invalidate the effect 
of the CDSO. The insertion of the sunset provision underlines the 
inequity of the scheme, so exporters should press an APA claim to 
force the modification of the enforcement regulations as they 
otherwise would not have a remedy under either international or 
domestic law. 
 
 
152 Appellate Report, supra note 21, ¶¶ 286–88. 
153 E.g., ISSUES AND EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND 
SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT, supra note 136, at 45. 
